Bilevel Models on the Competitive Facility Location Problem

Abstract

Facility location and allocation problems have been a major area of research for decades, which has led to a vast and still growing literature. Although there are many variants of these problems, there exist two common features: finding the best locations for one or more facilities and allocating demand points to these facilities. A considerable number of studies assume a monopolistic viewpoint and formulate a mathematical model to optimize an objective function of a single decision maker. In contrast, competitive facility location (CFL) problem is based on the premise that there exist competition in the market among different firms. When one of the competing firms acts as the leader and the other firm, called the follower, reacts to the decision of the leader, a sequential-entry CFL problem is obtained, which gives rise to a Stackelberg type of game between two players. A successful and widely applied framework to formulate this type of CFL problems is bilevel programming (BP). In this chapter, the literature on BP models for CFL problems is reviewed, existing works are categorized with respect to defined criteria, and information is provided for each work.