Hukuk Fakültesi Koleksiyonu
Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11779/1935
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Article Effect of Belief in Free Will on the Intensity of Third-Party Punishment(Istanbul University Press, 2025) Çakar, Tuna; Akyürek, Güçlü; Erözden, Ozan; Özen, Zeynep; Şahin, Türkay; Keskin, İrem Nur; Ünlü, MeryemThe institutionalized criminal justice mechanisms are built on two psychological and social traits: third-party punishment (TPP) and belief in free will (BFW). TPP is the administration of a sanction to a transgressor by an individual not affected by the transgression. BFW posits that humans are in control of their actions. Previous studies have indicated that BFW influences TPP. The aim of this study is to investigate whether the level of BFW has an impact on the magnitude of punishment in TPP tasks. Furthermore, it questions whether the degree of affective arousal of the punisher creates an additional effect on the magnitude of the punishment. Our basic hypothesis is that the BFW and punishment magnitude are positively correlated. We also hypothesize that the expected positive correlation between BFW and punishment magnitude will be more manifest in low-affect scenarios than in high-affect ones. Participants (N = 726) were given 49 hypothetical crime scenarios categorized as low- and high-affect cases. Upon reading each scenario, the participants were tasked to attribute a penalty between the two given options. Our results showed that the level of BFW was positively correlated with the degree of punishment administered in the hypothetical crime scenarios and that the average punishment magnitude for participants with a low level of BFW increased in the high-affect crime scenarios. We assume that our results would shed light on the underlying causes of public reactions to criminal sentencing policies, thus helping lawmakers in enacting better regulations in this respect. 2025. Çakar, T., Akyürek, G., Erözden, O., Şahin, T., Keskin, İ. N., Ünlü, M., Özen, D. H. & Özen, Z.Article Citation - Scopus: 1Les Conventions Préparatoires(Istanbul University Press, 2023) Işıntan, PelinLa phase précontractuelle est une zone grise, difficile à cerner et gouvernée par la liberté contractuelle. Les parties sont libres d’organiser leurs pourparlers conventionnellement et s’imposer des devoirs contractuels même en période précontractuelle. Par convention précontractuelle nous entendons un acte bilatéral qui vise la conclusion du contrat négocié. Puisque le Code des Obligations turc ne consacre pas une section spécifique aux pourparlers les parties ont grand intérêt à organiser cette phase et définir les règles à suivre et leurs comportements réciproques. Les parties peuvent former des actes précontractuels sous des formes et avec des contenus très variés. Nous allons nous limiter aux actes bilatéraux conclus entre les parties puisque nous examinons les conventions préparatoires. Par conséquent, les actes unilatéraux tels que la lettre d’intention envoyée par l’une des parties avec l’intention de débuter les pourparlers ne seraient pas traités dans cet article. Ainsi nous envisageons une étude sur les conventions précontractuelles en tenant compte de leur effet obligatoire. Dans un premier temps, nous traiterons les conventions qu’on pourrait appeler les contrats préparatoires qui créent un effet obligatoire pour au moins une des parties, et ensuite nous examinerons les conventions munies d’un tel effet.Article Executive Remuneration of Company Directors Under Eu Law and Turkish Law(Istanbul University Press, 2023) Özcanlı, Fatma BerilThe criteria to determine the material scope of executive pay has always been a controversial aspect of corporate law and corporate governance. The controversy stems from the fact that the board of directors generally tends to determine a suitable executive remuneration for its members, not considering the interests of other stakeholders. In some cases, an independent compensation/remuneration committee is appointed by the board of directors and determines the amount of executive pay. Depending on the legislation, this may require additional approval at the annual general meeting by the shareholders. European legislators have differing approaches with regards to regulating this very area of corporate pay. The revised Shareholders Rights Directive requires an enhanced approach for the shareholders' role by determining the remuneration policy of the company. These amendments can be identified as the promotion of the say on pay, on the remuneration policy, and remuneration report. Furthermore, the previous recommendations have also set the criteria to determine the amount of remuneration. The Directive contains provisions for setting up a clear and transparent corporate remuneration policy and shareholders' binding vote with temporary derogations. The corporate remuneration system of Turkish law is legislated under Art. 394 TCC (Turkish Commercial Code Nr. 6102), which only requires that board members can be paid an honorarium, salary, bonus, premium, and a portion of the annual profit, provided that this amount is determined by the articles of association, or by way of a general meeting resolution. Art. 408 TCC also stipulates a binding general meeting approval of the remuneration policy, whereas Art. 513 TCC requires the framework with regard to bankruptcy procedures. © 2023 Istanbul University Press. All rights reserved.