The Unconstitutional ‘semi-Presidentialism’ in France and Turkey: How Does Popular Consent Enable Presidents To Abuse Power?

Abstract

When Maurice Duverger wrote his article on semi-presidential systems, hewas aiming to defy the binary approach stuck between presidential and parliamentaryform of government. However, the category and its definition are still contested.Despite the debate around the concept, France remains an archetype to this form ofgovernment for majority of scholars. When Duverger classified France as an exampleof semi-presidential government and a country with all-powerful presidency, hepointed out merely four cases of unconstitutional use of powers and concluded thatthe consent of Prime Ministers enabled the transfer of powers to the President. Yet, asthe French cohabitation experience proved, Article 21 of the Constitution statesclearly that the head of government is not the President of Republic but the PrimeMinister and the consent of Prime Minister does not clear the unconstitutional natureof this transfer of power. The French experience of semi-presidentialism is aparticular example to compare with Turkey in this sense, as Turkey’s currentPresident is the first President that has been popularly elected, and de facto transfer ofPrime Minister’s powers to the President is a gradual and continuing phenomenonwithin the system. I argue that implementing a popularly elected president to aconstitution originally designed for a rationalized parliamentary regime creates a riskregarding the abuse of presidential power. To this aim, the transformation of Turkishand French systems will be analyzed not only in a strictly legal perspective but alsowithin the historical and political circumstances surrounding the election of firstpopularly elected Presidents.